Beijing - There is a timid nature to Beijing's Tibetan policy and its control over the choice of Tibet's spiritual leaders is nowhere near sufficient to prop up Beijing's rule in Tibet.

In January 2000, the 15-year-old Karmapa Lama (Tibet's third most important spiritual leader) fled to India. The boy had been previously chosen jointly by China and the Dalai Lama, and the choice was so difficult that in Sikkim, India, another Karmapa resides in the ancestral Abbey of the Karmapas.

The flight is extremely important because the Dalai Lama, belonging to the yellow sect, is just one of many Tibetan groups of the region. The yellow sect became the most prominent one in Tibet thanks to the support of the Qing rulers of Beijing. In a way the agreement between the Dalai Lama and Beijing to choose the Karmapa, who belongs to the sect of the black hats, stressed the prominence of the yellow sect over the other Tibetan Buddhists.

After the flight, the young Karmapa pledged his allegiance to the Dalai Lama, and thus stressed the Dalai Lama's moral authority over Tibet without calling in Beijing. Now pictures of the Dalai Lama, the Karmapa and the young Panchen appear in many Tibetan houses and temples, and the propaganda war waged by Beijing against the Dalai Lama has hardly dented his prestige with Tibetans.

Conversely, the heavy Chinese military presence in Tibet, the smoldering dissent in the region, and the fear of anti-Chinese protests proves the objective difficulty of ruling Tibet without the Dalai Lama. Beijing is also well aware of the many advantages it could obtain by bringing home the Dalai Lama. Tibet has been for some 2000 years the bridge between China and India, and could be even more so now. Large swathes of the Chinese-Indian border are disputed; the disputes were serious enough to bring the two countries to war in 1962, and caused waves of anti-Chinese sentiments in India. The return and peaceful resettling of the Dalai Lama in China might not solve all the border issues, which involve even the Kashmiri region, but would certainly help to ease the tension.

Another large advantage would come from the world popularity of the Dalai Lama. In 42 years of exile, the Dalai Lama has kept the loyalty of Tibet while also gaining the admiration of the world. He is, alongside the Roman Catholic Pope, perhaps the most famous religious leader in the world. His return to China would greatly improve Beijing's global popularity ratings and international standing, in a way similar to what the Pope does with Italy.

Perhaps Beijing could learn how to handle the Dalai Lama by following the Italian example. Italy is the only modern nation-state born out of the conquest of a religious state, the Vatican, which held a position comparable to that of Tibet in the former Chinese Empire. In 1870, Italian troops invaded Rome and basically imprisoned the Pope, who, strangely enough, did not flee abroad. It then took the Pope and the Italian state 59 years to broker a compromise and recognize each other.

Yet, it is not clear what the Dalai Lama's agenda is: his return to Tibet or the spread of his religion? In the first instance, he might be prone to looking for a compromise with Beijing; in the second, the plight of Tibet would serve him well in expanding his global influence. Unfortunately for Beijing, after 50 years of Chinese rule in Tibet the Dalai Lama still controls Tibetans' hearts, and Beijing needs the Dalai Lama more than the Dalai Lama needs Beijing.

As opposed to Xinjiang, ethnic Han Chinese are unwilling to move to Tibet and the majority of the population is still Tibetan. Furthermore, the "Sinofication" of Tibet would destroy this region's identity as a cultural bridge to India and hamper future relations with southern Asia. The Dalai Lama is also preparing his long-term strategy, having already announced that his reincarnation could be borne out of Tibet: a Caucasian boy who would appeal to the many Westerners already sympathetic with the Tibetan cause. In this case, Beijing's difficulties would further increase.

Is Beijing thus ready to reach out for the Dalai Lama? Is he willing to help Beijing? The issue, for certain, is purely a political one, as Beijing has long stopped being interested in religion. Therefore, what can Beijing offer to the Dalai Lama that the West does not already give him? Beijing's only real lure for the Dalai Lama might be the same one tickling large multinational companies eager for China's accession to the World Trade Organization - a huge potential basin of consu.. This basin of souls, now embracing Falungong and other fringe beliefs, could turn to the Dalai Lama if he is willing to reach out in China. Buddhism could also become more popular in the Indian subcontinent, and in theory about half of the world's population could lend its ears to the Dalai Lama who could even overcome, in time, the world status of the Roman Catholic Pope.

As Beijing has cleverly played up the potential of its economic market between competing countries, it could arguably do the same with competing religions in order to buttress its internal security and external influence.